Philosophy
Moral Luck and the Asymmetry of Praise and Blame
Quick fact
Philosophers note a striking asymmetry: we strongly blame a negligent driver who kills a pedestrian, but we rarely praise an equally negligent driver who happens not to hit anyone. Similarly, an attempted murder is punished less severely than a completed murder, even if the difference is pure luck.
Why this is interesting
You've probably heard of 'moral luck'—but why do we blame someone for a harm that could just as easily not have happened, while we rarely praise them for avoiding it? Why does the driver who hits a child face outrage, while the equally reckless driver who gets home safely is just lucky?
Read the full explanation
Understanding Moral Luck and the Asymmetry of Praise and Blame
Imagine two drivers: both are texting while driving, both swerve, but one hits a child while the other narrowly misses. We intuitively condemn the first much more strongly, but their actions—and their degree of control—were identical. This is moral luck at work: factors outside your control (whether someone steps into the street) affect how we judge you. The 'control principle' says we should only be judged on what we can control, but moral luck contradicts this. The asymmetry of praise and blame means we let luck inflate blame more easily than praise: we blame people for harming others, but we rarely praise them for just avoiding harm. Our moral emotions—blame, guilt, resentment—seem more responsive to actual outcomes than to intentions alone.
A deeper explanation
The asymmetry arises because blame is a response to harm done, while praise is often reserved for going beyond duty—doing something good that isn't required. When someone causes harm, we seek an explanation and find fault; when someone avoids harm, we attribute it to chance and feel no obligation to praise. Philosophers like Thomas Nagel distinguish types of moral luck: resultant luck (outcomes), circumstantial luck, constitutive luck, and causal luck. The asymmetry of blame is especially strong with resultant luck: attempted wrongs are blamed less than completed ones, even if the difference is luck. This creates a paradox: we believe in the control principle, but our practices violate it. Some philosophers (e.g., Nagel) argue this is a genuine problem we can't resolve; others, like Bernard Williams, accept the asymmetry and suggest our moral judgments are not meant to be perfectly systematic. The asymmetry matters because it reveals that our moral community is built on holding people accountable for outcomes, not just intentions, which raises difficult questions about fairness and responsibility.