Philosophy
The Problem of Moral Luck
Quick fact
The term 'moral luck' was coined by philosopher Bernard Williams in 1976, and the concept was famously developed by Thomas Nagel in his 1979 essay 'Moral Luck'.
Why this is interesting
Two drivers both text while driving; one hits a child, the other doesn't. We blame the first much more harshly, but was the difference really in their control?
Read the full explanation
Understanding The Problem of Moral Luck
Imagine two people who both decide to drive recklessly. One happens to swerve and kill a pedestrian; the other just barely misses and continues home. Most people would judge the first driver more harshly, perhaps even as a murderer, while the second might only be seen as reckless. Yet the only difference between them is luck—the pedestrian happened to be in the path of one, not the other. This is an example of 'resultant luck'. Moral luck occurs when we assign moral praise or blame—or judge the moral character—of a person based on factors that are largely or entirely outside their control. Thomas Nagel identified four types: resultant luck (as in the car example), circumstantial luck (e.g., being born in a peaceful time vs. a genocidal regime), constitutive luck (your innate temperament and talents), and causal luck (the fact that your actions are determined by prior causes). The 'problem' arises because we seem to have a deep intuition—often called the 'control principle'—that we are only morally responsible for what we control. Yet our actual judgments and legal systems frequently violate this principle. If we take the control principle seriously, we might have to conclude that nobody deserves praise or blame at all, because ultimately everything about us—our genes, environment, and decisions—is shaped by factors we did not choose. But if we abandon the principle, we seem to fall into unfairness and moral arbitrariness. This tension is the core of the philosophical problem of moral luck.
A deeper explanation
The problem of moral luck cuts to the heart of how we think about moral responsibility. It is not just an abstract puzzle; it has real implications for ethics, law, and everyday life. The underlying mechanism is the conflict between two powerful intuitions: (1) that moral responsibility requires control, and (2) that we do, in fact, judge people for things they don't fully control—and it seems right to do so. For instance, we all would blame someone who accidentally kills a child more than someone who merely drives recklessly, even though the intent and the momentary control were identical. Why? Because we care about outcomes and real harm, not just intentions. This is not just a flaw in our moral psychology; it may be a necessary feature of a functioning moral and legal system. If we refused to consider outcomes, we would have to utterly restructure law and ethics. But if we accept outcome-based judgment, we must accept that luck plays a role in our moral standing, which seems to conflict with the idea that we are moral agents with free will. Philosophers have responded in various ways. Some, like Nagel, think the problem reveals a fundamental paradox that we cannot fully resolve. Others, like Bernard Williams, argue that we should accept luck as a genuine part of morality, and that the 'control principle' is too demanding. Still others, like some Kantians, double down on the control principle and conclude that we should only judge intentions, not outcomes. The problem also connects to free will and determinism: if determinism is true, then no one ever has ultimate control, so moral responsibility of any kind might be impossible. Moral luck is thus a lens through which we see that our moral concepts are fragile and might not be fully coherent. It challenges us to ask: What does it mean to deserve praise or blame? And can we ever escape the arbitrariness of our circumstances?