Philosophy
The Doxastic Voluntarism Debate: Can We Choose What to Believe?
Quick fact
The term 'doxastic' comes from the Greek word 'doxa' for belief; the debate about its voluntariness dates back to the ancient Greeks but was revived by W.K. Clifford and William James in the 19th century.
Why this is interesting
You choose what to wear, what to eat, even what to say. But can you truly choose to believe the sky is green, simply because you want to?
Read the full explanation
Understanding The Doxastic Voluntarism Debate: Can We Choose What to Believe?
Imagine you are at a magic show, and the magician places a red ball under a cup. Even if someone offers you a million dollars to believe the ball is blue, you cannot simply make yourself believe that—the evidence of your eyes makes the belief that the ball is red irresistible. This illustrates the intuition that beliefs are not directly under our control. Instead, they seem to happen to us based on evidence and perception. However, think about choosing to believe that a friend will succeed against the odds, or deciding to trust in a scientific theory before all data is in—these seem to involve a kind of voluntary endorsement. Thus, the debate over doxastic voluntarism: some philosophers argue that we have direct, that is, immediate conscious control over at least some of our beliefs, while others say that beliefs are involuntary, forced upon us by evidence. The debate is not just about defining 'choose'—it touches on whether we can be morally blamed for our convictions, and whether we are rational to believe without sufficient evidence.
A deeper explanation
The core of the debate is the question: 'Can an agent, simply by an act of will, adopt or discard a belief directly?' The position of direct doxastic voluntarism holds that we have such control, similar to our control over raising an arm. But this is controversial because beliefs aim at truth. When you believe something, you take it to be true. If you could choose arbitrarily, you could choose to believe falsehoods, which would undermine the very purpose of belief. Moreover, experiments in cognitive psychology often show that beliefs are formed automatically, below the level of awareness, without conscious choice. Yet, there are cases of self-deception and wishful thinking where people seem to adopt beliefs because they want them to be true. The debate draws a line between direct control (voluntariness) and indirect control (e.g., by choosing what evidence to expose yourself to). Philosophers like W.K. Clifford argued in 'The Ethics of Belief' that 'it is wrong, always, anywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence,' which presupposes that we have some control over our beliefs—otherwise praising or blaming them would be unfair. In contrast, William James's 'The Will to Believe' defended the right to adopt certain beliefs (like in free will or religious faith) when evidence is inconclusive and the choice is momentous. These positions highlight not only a metaphysical question about mental states but also a moral one about epistemic responsibility. The modern debate also engages with cognitive science, which suggests that belief formation is a mixture of automatic and deliberate processes, possibly leading to an intermediate position: we have indirect or 'bullible' control—we can influence our beliefs over time through habits of inquiry, but we cannot flip them on command.