Philosophy
The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects and Nonexistent Entities
Quick fact
Philosophers have long argued about the 'ontological status' of fictional creatures like Sherlock Holmes and mythological gods like Zeus—whether they exist in some sense, are merely fictions, or are a complex blend of reality and imagination. The debate remains unresolved, and the puzzle even connects to logical paradoxes like the problem of 'Vulcan', a planet once believed to exist but later proven not to.
Why this is interesting
When you say 'Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street,' you seem to be talking about someone real, but he never existed. How can a sentence about a fictional character be meaningful—and sometimes even true?
Read the full explanation
Understanding The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects and Nonexistent Entities
When we talk about fictional characters, we often speak as if they exist. We say Holmes is a detective, lives in London, and has a friend named Watson. Yet we also know Holmes never walked the streets of the real London. So how can a statement like 'Holmes is a detective' be true?\n\nThe puzzle arises because our language and thoughts seem to point at things—to 'refer'. If there is no Holmes in the real world, what is the sentence about? This is called the problem of nonexistent objects or the problem of intentionality: the mind can think about things that are not there.\n\nOne everyday solution is to say that fictions are just imaginary. When we read a novel, we pretend that the characters exist. We don't literally believe in them; we engage in a game of make-believe. This is called 'fictionalism'—a view that says fictional names don't refer to anything real; they are part of a pretense.\n\nBut that raises another question: why does it seem so natural to say 'Holmes is a detective' is true? Within the context of the story, it is true. So perhaps truth is context-relative.\n\nAnother approach, called 'Platonism' or 'abstract object theory', suggests that fictional characters do exist, but not as physical beings. They are abstract objects, like numbers or properties. Holmes exists as an abstract entity created by Conan Doyle's imagination. This explains why we can refer to him and make true claims about him, but it seems strange to say that Holmes 'exists' in the same way that the Eiffel Tower does.\n\nA third, more radical view is 'Meinongianism', named after Alexius Meinong. It holds that there are two modes of being: existence (for things that are real) and subsistence or having a form of being even if they don't exist. For Meinong, Holmes 'subsists'—he has properties, but he does not exist. This allows us to talk about him and attribute properties to him, even though he lacks existence.\n\nThese positions offer different answers to the same core question: what does it mean for something to exist? And how do we make sense of our talk about what does not exist?
A deeper explanation
The heart of the debate is the nature of existence and reference. Standard logic, as developed by Bertrand Russell, treats sentences about nonexistent things in a special way. Russell's theory of descriptions says that a statement like 'The present King of France is bald' is false, because there is no unique object fitting that description. For fictional names, Russell and others would analyze them as descriptions or as parts of stories, so that 'Holmes is a detective' means something like 'According to the stories, there is a man named Holmes who is a detective.' This avoids positing any mysterious entity.\n\nBut this 'paraphrase' strategy has difficulties. It seems to change what we are saying. When we say 'Holmes is a detective,' we seem to be making a claim about Holmes himself, not merely about a story.\n\nOn the other side, philosophers like Alexius Meinong introduced the notion of 'object theory' and the idea that there are objects that do not exist. Meinong argued that we can refer to such things, and they have properties, even if they lack existence. However, his view was criticized by Russell, who pointed out that Meinong's theory would allow contradictions—like the round square—if we accept that every concept corresponds to an object. For instance, if we think of an object that is both round and square, it would have the property of being both round and square, violating logic.\n\nThe modern debate has refined these ideas. Saul Kripke and others have argued that fictional names are not like names of real things; they are introduced by a 'fiction-making act' and refer to abstract objects created by authors. This is called 'creationism' or 'platonism about fiction.' According to this view, Holmes exists as an abstract artifact, created by Conan Doyle, and his properties are determined by the story.\n\nAnother view is 'possibilism', which claims that fictional characters are possible objects—things that could have existed but didn't. But this runs into problems with characters like Sherlock Holmes, who are impossible because they are inconsistent (e.g., described as having a scar that appears and disappears).\n\nThe debate matters because it forces us to clarify what existence is and how our mental and linguistic representation works. It also has consequences for logic, mathematics (where we refer to infinite sets and other abstract objects), and aesthetics. Understanding the different positions helps us see that 'existence' is not as simple as we might think.