Philosophy
Moral Luck and the Problem of Control in Ethical Evaluation
Quick fact
Philosopher Thomas Nagel identified four types of moral luck: result, circumstance, constitutive, and causal. Result luck alone explains why we judge a negligent driver more harshly when they happen to kill someone than when they cause no harm—even though the only difference is luck.
Why this is interesting
Imagine two drivers who both run a red light. One hits a pedestrian; the other doesn't. We blame the first far more harshly, but wasn't their driving the same?
Read the full explanation
Understanding Moral Luck and the Problem of Control in Ethical Evaluation
At first glance, morality seems to require that we are judged only for what is within our control. If you do everything right but fail due to bad luck, we don't blame you. If you do wrong but succeed, we still blame you. This is the control principle: 'ought implies can,' and responsibility requires control. But our everyday moral judgments often violate this principle. Consider two drivers: both are equally negligent, but one hits a child who darts into the street, while the other drives through the intersection safely. We feel the first driver is more blameworthy—they caused a death. Yet the only difference is luck: the child's presence. This is called result luck. We also judge people differently based on circumstances: a person who grows up in a violent environment may be more prone to violence, but we still blame them. Constitutive luck refers to our temperament and natural abilities, which we don't choose. Causal luck is about the events that led us to be who we are. These examples show that our moral evaluations are influenced by factors beyond control. This creates a tension: we believe in the control principle, but we also feel that certain outcomes matter morally. The problem of moral luck is that these two commitments conflict.
A deeper explanation
The mechanism behind moral luck lies in the nature of moral judgment itself. When we evaluate an action, we don't just consider the agent's intention; we also consider the actual consequences. This is because moral judgments are partly forward-looking (they aim to guide behavior) and partly backward-looking (they express our reactive attitudes like blame and resentment). Moral luck reveals that we cannot consistently apply the control principle. If we take it seriously, we would have to revise our judgments radically: the negligent driver who kills and the one who doesn't would be equally blameworthy. But our actual practices don't do that. We also incorporate outcome information because it matters for the victim, for the agent's character, and for the social function of blame. Philosopher Bernard Williams argued that moral luck is not a mistake but a feature of our moral life. He introduced the idea of 'agent regret': even when we act with no fault, if our actions cause harm, we feel a distinctive self-directed regret. This regret is not based on control but on the fact that we were the cause. For example, a lorry driver who unintentionally runs over a child feels agent regret, even if he was fully careful. This shows that our moral emotions are not always proportional to our control. Furthermore, moral luck challenges the fairness of moral evaluation. If we blame someone for something they couldn't control, are we being unfair? Yet, if we stop blaming, we might lose the motivational force of morality. The problem persists because both alternatives seem unacceptable. This problem matters for ethics because it forces us to clarify what we are evaluating: the agent's character, their actions, or the outcomes. It also has practical implications for legal systems, where causation and consequences heavily influence punishment, even when intentions are similar. In summary, moral luck is not a puzzle that can be easily solved; it reveals a deep tension in our moral framework. We must decide whether to revise our judgments to align with the control principle or to accept that luck legitimately influences our moral appraisals.