Philosophy
Ethical Intuitionism and the Guises of Moral Self-Evidence
Quick fact
The philosopher W.D. Ross famously listed a set of 'prima facie duties' (like fidelity, reparation, and beneficence) that he considered self-evident, meaning they are known directly without needing further justification.
Why this is interesting
You probably believe that torturing children for fun is wrong. But could you prove that statement beyond any doubt? What if your confidence comes not from a proof, but from an intuition that is so basic it cannot be derived from anything else?
Read the full explanation
Understanding Ethical Intuitionism and the Guises of Moral Self-Evidence
Imagine you are building a house of knowledge. Every belief you have is like a brick that rests on other bricks. But if you keep asking 'Why?' you eventually reach a foundation—claims that don't need support from other bricks. Ethical intuitionism says that at the foundation of our moral knowledge are certain basic ethical truths—for example, 'it is wrong to inflict pain on others merely for fun.' These truths are self-evident: we can grasp their truth simply by understanding the concepts involved, much like we grasp that 2+2=4. The 'guises' of self-evidence refer to the different ways these truths appear to us: they can be obvious, they can be seen as necessary (they couldn't be otherwise), and they often feel axiomatic, like starting points for reasoning. Just as logical and mathematical axioms are accepted without proof, ethical intuitionists argue that some moral principles are similarly basic.
A deeper explanation
The mechanism behind ethical intuitionism is the idea that moral truths are not discovered by empirical observation (like scientific facts) or derived from non-moral premises (like naturalistic ethics). Instead, they are known a priori, through rational intuition. The 'guises' of self-evidence capture different epistemic features: 1) Self-evident truths are such that merely understanding them is sufficient for seeing that they are true. They are not justified by evidence or argument. 2) They are often seen as necessary truths—in all possible worlds, certain moral wrongs are wrong. 3) They often appear as axiom-like, serving as foundational premises for moral reasoning. The intuitionist account is a form of foundationalism about ethics: it opposes the idea that moral justification requires an infinite chain of reasons, arguing instead that some moral principles are properly basic. This matters because it provides a basis for moral knowledge that is independent of religion, culture, or empirical facts, and it explains why we can be as confident about some moral truths as we are about mathematical truths.