Economics
The Political Economy of Resource Nationalism in Petrostates
Quick fact
In 2019, Bolivia's gas nationalization under Evo Morales was part of a wave where governments took larger shares of resource profits just after oil prices spiked, a pattern seen repeatedly since the 1970s.
Why this is interesting
You’ve probably heard that oil-rich countries often go through booms and busts, but why do they sometimes seize control of their own oil fields from foreign companies, even when it risks scaring investors away?
Read the full explanation
Understanding The Political Economy of Resource Nationalism in Petrostates
Think of a petrostate as a country sitting on a goldmine—literally under their soil lies oil or gas that global companies want to extract and sell. In exchange for access, the government can charge taxes, take a share of the oil, or even outright own the extraction company. Resource nationalism is when the government decides to grab a bigger piece of that pie. It can happen during a price boom, when oil is expensive and the government feels it's losing out, or during a political crisis, when leaders want to show strength by taking control. The first step is often a change in the law or contract, say increasing the tax rate from 30% to 50%, or forcing foreign companies to renegotiate their deals. Sometimes, the state buys out the company's assets, or even expropriates them. The result is that the state captures more of the revenue, but it also takes on more risk—if prices fall, the state feels the pinch directly, and investors may become wary of coming back.
A deeper explanation
At its core, resource nationalism is driven by the political logic of control. Unlike regular businesses, oil and gas extraction generates 'rents'—the difference between the cost of production and the market price—which can be enormous. These rents are often seen as 'easy money' that the state can use for public spending, patronage, or building legitimacy. Politicians have an incentive to capture these rents to fund their agendas and stay in power. The mechanism is a tug-of-war between the state and private companies over who gets the largest slice of the rents. When commodity prices are high, the pie grows, and the state feels it's being shortchanged—so it pushes for more. When prices are low, the state may be more accommodating to attract investment. This cyclical behavior is a key pattern. Countries with strong institutions and a diverse economy tend to resist resource nationalism because they don't rely on oil alone. But in 'petrostates' where oil is the main source of revenue, the state's survival often hinges on capturing those rents, making resource nationalism an attractive and recurring strategy. However, this approach can backfire: foreign investors lose confidence, technology transfer slows, and the state may struggle to manage the industry efficiently, especially when prices go down. Thus, resource nationalism is a double-edged sword for petrostates, shaping their economic stability and political trajectory over time.